Hominization theory speculates on the process and chronology of a human embryo’s ensoulment. Aristotle, a key ancient Greek thinker, presented his own hominization theory based on his hylemorphic metaphysics and pioneering researches in embryology. Thomas Aquinas, a medieval philosopher and theologian, built his Christian and Catholic hominization theory on the foundations laid down by Aristotle. The contemporary Roman Catholic Church, with its own prolife, anti-abortion and anticontraception agenda, modified the Aristotelian and Thomistic hominization theories by allegedly benchmarking on recent developments (...) in human embryology. This paper uses the archeological and genealogical methods, as developed by the French poststructuralist and postmodernist philosopher Michel Foucault, in reexamining these three hominization theories as discourses, in comparing and contrasting their epistemic contexts, and in peering into their respective genealogies. Contrary to common assumptions, these three hominization theories have very few elements in common and are actually divergent. The underpinning intention of this paper is to demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the contemporary Roman Catholic Church’s hominization theory. (shrink)

If we are to periodize the intellectual biography of Rolando Gripaldo into his Mindanaoan, Lasallian, and retirement periods, his Lasallian period would be a very significant one because this is the period where he produced the most important works that earned him a niche as one of the important Filipino philosophers. This paper exposed and analyzed the works of Gripaldo in this very significant period of his intellectual biography. This paper was able to identify four clusters of themes that recur (...) in Gripaldo’s Lasallian period writings: 1) his reflective thoughts on Filipino philosophy, 2) his studies of Filipino philosophical luminaries, 3) his critical Filipino philosophy, and 3) his efforts towards revisionist writing. This paper contributes towards the discourse of Filipino philosophy that studies Filipino philosophical luminaries, a discourse in which Gripaldo was a leading advocate. Contributions in this specific discourse can make Filipino philosophy more mainstream and easier to study, especially for beginners and undergraduate students. (shrink)

Quito published her book The State of Philosophy in the Philippines in 1983. When the book was already out for fifteen years, I undertook a re-reading of its identified four clusters of reasons for the underdevelopment of Filipino philosophy, and hope for development in 1999, through an article “Re-Reading Emerita Quito’s Thoughts Concerning the Underdevelopment of Filipino Philosophy.” Thirty-six years after the publication of Quito’s book, and twenty years after the publication of my re-reading, this paper looks back again on (...) Quito’s four clusters of reasons and hope, as well as on my re-reading of such reasons and hope, with the intention of sharpening our collective diagnosis on what continue to cause the underdevelopment of Filipino philosophy, as well as imagining more realistic pathways towards its more robust development. This paper, therefore, has two substantive sections: the first is an exposition of Quito’s four clusters of causes and hope, accompanied by my commentaries on such four causes and hope; and the second is my present critical reflection on Quito’s thirty-four-year-old diagnosis and hope, as well as on my twenty-year-old commentary. (shrink)

This paper compares and contrasts the taxonomies and periodizations of Filipino philosophy by seven Filipino scholars -- Fernando Zialcita, Florentino Timbreza, Emerita Quito, Romualdo Abulad, Napoleon Mabaquiao, Rolando Gripaldo, and Alfredo Co -- in order to determine the various philosophical discourses that are present in the country, and in order to pinpoint which of these discourses offer higher developmental potentials for Filipino philosophy. For each taxonomy and periodization, this paper looks into: (1) the period covered, (2) the inclusivity or exclusivity (...) of the classification/configuration, (3) the taxonomizer/periodizer utilized, (4) the implied structure of the classification/configuration, (5) the problematic classes/periods suggested by the classification/configuration, and (6) the promising classes/Periods suggested by the classification/configuration. This paper concludes with an attempt to synthesize the thoughts of these seven scholars in a comprehensive taxonomy of Filipino philosophies and to give an overall assessment for each of these philosophies' strengths and weaknesses. (shrink)

This paper is written to provide an aesthetic parameter to sensibly analyze the controversy that arose after the naming of Carlo J. Caparas as National Artist for Visual Arts and Film. By contextualizing Caparas and his works in five clusters of aesthetic systems, namely, traditional, modern, patronage, pseudo-modern, and postmodern, this paper argues that there can never be a coherent, sustained, and rational justification for the error committed by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in honoring him. The paper concludes with the note (...) that the aesthetic discourse on the controversy was unfortunately converted into a legal discourse as a case was filed by some National Artists, Art Groups, and concerned citizens at the Supreme Court, questioning the legality of the so-called “presidential insertion.”. (shrink)

This paper is premised on the thought that aside from Emerita Quito, who is generally considered in the Philippines as the "Filipino philosopher, " there is another Filipina philosopher who is unfortunately ignored in the various philosophy circles in the country but whose works and scholarship can easily rival those of the former. This paper, therefore, surveys the thoughts of Mary John Mananzan in order to understand her contributions to the development of Filipino philosophy. To attain such a goal, this (...) paper discusses six substantive sections, which tackle the following: (]) her intellectual biography, (2) her critique of patriarchal religion, (3) her critique of the Philippine political economy, (4) her critique of patriarchal everyday culture, (5) her critique of Philippine colonization, and (6) her recollections on her own political praxis. This paper defines the place of Mananzan among the various discourses of Filipino philosophy and assesses her contributions to such a philosophy. (shrink)

In his two articles, F. P. A. Demeterio III attempts to classify works in Filipino philosophy using a list of twelve (or sixteen) supposed discourses that prominent philosophers in the Philippines have engaged in and published over the past few years. From this list, he advises current Filipino philosophers to invest their time and effort in contributing to only five of these because of their alleged higher measure of "developmental potential" as opposed to other discourses. In this paper, we (...) raise some fundamental issues with Demeterio's approach. We show that (i) his work's conclusions rest on questionable methodological assumptions that make (ii) the discourses which the work arrived at and the rankings in terms of "developmental potential" superficial and ungrounded. Finally, (iii) instead of fulfilling the main aim of advancing research in Filipino philosophy, the proposed approach may actually lead to its stagnation and demise. We argue that these issues, if left unanswered, make Demeterio's whole approach to Filipino philosophy unsound and may put into question the employment of such an approach. (shrink)

This paper explores the thoughts of Emerita Quito, Claro Ceniza, Florentino Timbreza, and Rolando Gripaldo as contributiors of De La Salle University to the development of Filipino philosophy in the cultural sense. These philosophy mentors ore selected based on their textual productivity and on the fact that they retired from DLSU as full professors. Filipino philosophy in this paper is limited to the following discourses: logical analysis, phenomenology/existentialism/hermeneutics, critical philosophy as an academic method; appropriation of foreign theories ; appropriation of (...) folk philosophy, revisionist writing, interpretation of Filipino worldview, research on Filipino values and ethics, identification of the presuppositions and implications of the Filipino worldview and the study on Filipino philosophical luminaries. This exploration concludes with some assessments of the aforementioned philosophers' more specific impact on Filipino philosophy. (shrink)

Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff wrote surprisingly often to British colleagues. Usually it was a matter of a letter or two. The prolonged exchange with Gilbert Murray is the exception. More typical is the brief but important one with Sir James George Frazer. Extant evidence attests that he corresponded with some forty Englishmen and Scots. I omit Anglo-Irish: J.B. Bury, J.P. Mahaffy, L.C. Purser and the papyrologist, J.G. Smily. The evidence is incomplete because most letters after the letter N were stolen and (...) burned in the Berlin winter 1945-6. A first catalogue of his British correspondents is assembled. Because of the remoteness of much published biographical material, I include references to the important published sources and occasionally publish a document which otherwise would be forgotten. For the first time Wilamowitz's influence on the English scholars of his time is precisely documented. (shrink)

Milbank’s correlation of modern rationality with a myth of chaos and an ontology of violence can preclude a naive theological reception of the social sciences, but while Milbank suggests a critique that would trace modernity’s truncation of reason and its nihilistic outcome to the post-Thomist reification of the supernatural and to Scotus’ conceptualism, his option for Augustine’s supernaturalism appears regressive. Irony attends both the violence of Milbank’s performance on behalf of an ontology of peace and his non-analogical, typically Protestant construal (...) of the faith/reason relationship. Nonetheless, he also suggests resources for a positive move beyond the discourse of paradox and contradiction. (shrink)

Keith Thomas: Gerald Edward Aylmer, 1926-2000 Adrian Hollis: William Spencer Barrett, 1914-2001 Bruce Williams: Charles Frederick Carter, 1919-2002 Malcolm Mackintosh: John Erickson, 1929-2002 J. H .R. Davis: Raymond William Firth, 1901-2002 F. M. L. Thompson: Hrothgar John Habakkuk, 1915-2002 A. W. Price: Richard Mervyn Hare, 1919-2002 Hugh Lloyd-Jones: Geoffrey Stephen Kirk, 1921-2003 Michael Lapidge and Peter Matthews: Vivien Anne Law, 1954-2002 Ann Moss: John Lough, 1913-2000 Terence Cave: Ian Dalrymple McFarlane, 1915-2002 Ludwig Paul: David Neil MacKenzie, 1926-2001 Peter Birks: John (...) Kieran Barry Moylan Nicholas, 1919-2002 Jonathan Shepard: Dimitri Dimitrievich Obolensky, 1918-2001 David Cannadine: John Harold Plumb, 1911-2001 Daniel Waley: Nicolai Rubinstein, 1911-2002 Ian Wood: John Michael Wallace-Hadrill, 1916-1985 R. G. M. Nisbet: William Smith Watt, 1913-2002 G. W. Bernard: Richard Bruce Wernham, 1906-1999. (shrink)

Mr. Garrod has earned the gratitude of all students of Manilius by his detection of the ratio of the series in iii. 599–615, and he is fully justified in his contention that tricenas in 612 is ‘one of the few emendations which can be proved mathematically.’ I owe him a special acknowledgment, inasmuch as his discovery enables me to add one more to the list and affords me an opportunity of establishing what was correct and correcting what was erroneous in (...) my discussion of the whole passage in Silua Maniliana, pp. 30 sqq. Let me do the last first. My suggestion of uix for bis in 616 of course disappears; bis sex is required by the series: and in 595–6 the number meant is 75, not 76. (shrink)

It has been frequently asserted that the western Roman supreme commander Stilicho’s neglect of the Transalpine provinces during the usurpation of Constantine III contributed to his eventual downfall in 408. Stilicho’s fatal flaw, in this recurring opinion, seems to have been a desire to annex eastern Illyricum for which he sought to employ Alaric. In a volte-face, he then wished to use Alaric as the leader of the western field army that was supposed to bring down Constantine. The aim of (...) this article is to advance several notes of critique on this narrative that has had a long life in Stilichonian scholarship. Instead it will demonstrate that a) the threat of Constantine has been overestimated, b) Stilicho had no designs on annexing eastern Illyricum, c) he had a military strategy ready against Constantine that was sound and in tandem with earlier civil wars, and d) that the intended role of Alaric during this enterprise has been misunderstood. Nevertheless, Stilicho’s military strategy in 408 proved to be fundamentally corrosive towards his hitherto carefully built-up political capital. Olympius, the architect of his demise and his precise knowledge of Stilicho’s army preparations, as befitted the magister officiorium, provided the former with the perfect material to fabricate stories of Stilicho coveting a throne while neglecting the west. This set in motion the plot that ultimately brought down Stilicho. (shrink)

A well-known open problem in epistemic logic is to give a syntactic characterization of the successful formulas. Semantically, a formula is successful if and only if for any pointed model where it is true, it remains true after deleting all points where the formula was false. The classic example of a formula that is not successful in this sense is the “Moore sentence” p ∧ ¬ BOX p, read as “p is true but you do not know p.” Not only (...) is the Moore sentence unsuccessful, it is self-refuting, for it never remains true as described. We show that in logics of knowledge and belief for a single agent (extended by S5), Moorean phenomena are the source of all self-refutation; moreover, in logics for an introspective agent (extending KD45), Moorean phenomena are the source of all unsuccessfulness as well. This is a distinctive feature of such logics, for with a non-introspective agent or multiple agents, non-Moorean unsuccessful formulas appear. We also consider how successful and self-refuting formulas relate to the Cartesian and learnable formulas, which have been discussed in connection with Fitch’s “paradox of knowability.” We show that the Cartesian formulas are exactly the formulas that are not eventually self-refuting and that not all learnable formulas are successful. In an appendix, we give syntactic characterizations of the successful and the self-refuting formulas. (shrink)

A well-known open problem in epistemic logic is to give a syntactic characterization of the successful formulas. Semantically, a formula is successful if and only if for any pointed model where it is true, it remains true after deleting all points where the formula was false. The classic example of a formula that is not successful in this sense is the “Moore sentence” p ∧ ¬ BOX p, read as “p is true but you do not know p.” Not only (...) is the Moore sentence unsuccessful, it is self-refuting, for it never remains true as described. We show that in logics of knowledge and belief for a single agent (extended by S5), Moorean phenomena are the source of all self-refutation; moreover, in logics for an introspective agent (extending KD45), Moorean phenomena are the source of all unsuccessfulness as well. This is a distinctive feature of such logics, for with a non-introspective agent or multiple agents, non-Moorean unsuccessful formulas appear. We also consider how successful and self-refuting formulas relate to the Cartesian and learnable formulas, which have been discussed in connection with Fitch’s “paradox of knowability.” We show that the Cartesian formulas are exactly the formulas that are not eventually self-refuting and that not all learnable formulas are successful. In an appendix, we give syntactic characterizations of the successful and the self-refuting formulas. (shrink)

In Hans Urs von Balthasar's 1947 Wahrheit, later republished as Theo-Logic I, he attempted to retrieve the notion that "truth is not just a property of knowledge but a transcendental quality of being as such". Villanova's D. C. Schindler enlists this retrieval in order to overcome "a metaphysics of presence," while also providing readers with an indispensable guide for navigating philosophical aspects of Balthasar's Werke. Although Schindler's text deals with notoriously dense subject matter, an undercurrent of pedagogical sense controls his (...) style and grants readers rewarding assimilation of a logic affirming both identity and difference within the concept of truth. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:John P. Anton C. P. CAVAFY'S ARS POETICA ' It is generally recognized that Constantine P. Cavafy (1863-1933) was not born a poet but became one only through persistence and labor, reaching his "first step" sometime after the midpoint of his life. In his effort to assess the quality of his earlier poetic production and sharpen his sensitivity in facing self-criticism, he decided to put in writing his personal (...) thoughts on his work sometime in 1903. The text was written in English in a personal shorthand Cavafy had devised for his own use. It was found among the papers he left to A. Sengopoulos and published for the first time in 1963 by M. Peridis, who also supplied the suitable title Ars Poetica. It falls outside the scope of this essay to discuss the antecedents of this document. Taken as a whole, the text has all the clarity and directness required of a testament designed to serve as a personal guide and handbook. The problems it discusses are limited to the needs of the poet. In this regard, the Ars Poetica has neither the range of topics nor the theoretical scope of, for instance, Aristotle's Poetics. It is quite certain that the ideas that preoccupy Cavafy in the Ars Poetica had been on his mind for a period of years. However, the Ars Poetica is his first prose piece where he gives a systematic treatment to technical and critical issues directly related to the assessment of his work and his role as a poet. In order to project here a clear image of Cavafy's struggle to reach his technical maturity which came after 1910, we need first to discuss the persistent problems he faced during this crucial decade, then to examine the attitudes and values he embodied in certain representative early poems, and finally to relate them to the guiding principles he formulated in his self-addressed poetics of 1903. A number of interrelated problems confronted Cavafy in his late twenties and throughout his thirties. They emerged one by one, to 85 86Philosophy and Literature make more pressing the demand for a consistent solution and a complete recasting of his outlook. Coming to terms with them was extremely difficult. Aside from the emotional and sexual pressures he had to face alone, there was the absence of suitable ideas and conceptual tools to provide him with even the rudiments of an intellectual framework. Whatever he borrowed from Europe and England, or resurrected from his own Hellenic heritage, proved either beyond assimilation or insufficiently digested. The lingering issues fell roughly into four areas. (i) Despite his determination to devote his life to the writing of poetry, the quality of his work was discouraging. He knew this and as a result he often expressed uncertainty about his ability to proceed. Time and again he appeared suffering from a feeling of inadequacy, but nevertheless he sought to engage a reflective mood from which to draw encouragement and hope. (ii) On the theoretical side, he identified with the long tradition which assigned a coveted cultural role to the savant-poet as discloser of truth and spokesman for humanity; this despite the prevailing climate of opinion in his immediate environment which recognized no such high position in his case. Cavafy knew that his standing with the Greek community of Alexandria had gradually dwindled with the loss of family wealth and his lowly employment, and also that his expectations to be respected in his role as a poet and leader in communal affairs were futile. This denial of personal recognition in a society dominated by commerce and finance contributed to his mood of depression. The feeling of being an outcast, despite his associations with the upper social circles of Alexandria, became a constant irritant to his sense of pride. (iii) The course of culture, the destiny of human institutions and the workings of history, became puzzles as he tried to view them through the opaque glass of disillusionment. These were the grand themes actively discussed in the writings of leading European intellectuals, but to the young poet they had a different personal urgency. His vital concern in this connection was not understanding science... (shrink)

Jacopo Zabarella’s two treatises On Methods and On Regressus (1578) are among the most important Renaissance discussions of how scientific knowledge should be acquired, arranged, and transmitted. They belong to a lively debate about the order in which sciences should be taught and the method to be followed in scientific demonstration that roiled the Late Renaissance world for decades. In these famous works Zabarella rejected the views of Ramists and modern Galenists in favor of the pure doctrine of Aristotle, freed (...) from misunderstandings foisted upon it by medieval interpreters. The influence of these works on Galileo’s scientific method and Descartes’ famous Discourse on Method (1637) has long been debated. They are here translated into English for the first time, along with a new Latin text based on the corrected 1586 edition. Volume 1 contains On Methods, Books I-II. Volume 2 contains On Methods, Books III-IV, and On Regressus. (shrink)

This paper is the third of a multi-part examination of the Babylonian mathematical lunar theories known as Systems A and B. Part I (Britton, AHES 61:83–145, 2007) addressed the development of the empirical elements needed to separate the effects of lunar and solar anomaly on the intervals between syzygies, accomplished in the construction of the System A lunar theory early in the fourth century B.C. Part II (Britton, AHES 63:357–431, 2009) examines the accomplishment of this separation by the construction of (...) a successful theory depicting the variations due to lunar anomaly in System A and its subsequent adaptation in System B. The present paper examines the introduction of the uniform zodiac, necessary for any theory depicting variations depending on the position of syzygy. It addresses three questions: (1) In light of all available evidence, what is the magnitude of the constant term in the expression Δλ* = C − 1.3828°Y, describing the difference between the Babylonian sidereal longitudes and modern tropical longitudes? (2) What considerations governed the placement of the Babylonian sidereal zodiac relative to the fixed stars? (3) When was the uniform zodiac introduced? To the first question it finds C = 3.20° ± 0.1°, scarcely different from Huber’s (Centaurus 5:192–208, 1958) estimate of 3.08°, essentially confirming Huber’s result obtained from much less data. For the second it shows that accommodating the three asterisms comprising Taurus limited the placement of the zodiac to within 3°, while the prominence of half sign multiples among the measured intervals between prominent Normal Stars led irresistibly to the choice adopted. Finally, it finds that the zodiac was introduced between −408 and −397 and probably within a very few years of −400. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 147 The Godly Image: Christ and Salvation in Catholic Thought from Anselm to Aquinas. By ROMANUS CESSARIO, O.P. Studies in historical theology. v. 6. Petersham, Mass.: St. Bede's Publications, 1990. Pp. xxiv + 214. $14.95 (paper). The Godly Image presents a retouched version of the author's dissertation, first published in 1982 as Christian Satisfaction in Aquinas: Towards a Personalist Understanding (Washington, DC: University Press of America). Seeking (...) a broader audience, the author has dropped the dissertation's numerous Latin footnotes, shortened and enlivened the chapter titles, and streamlined some of his arguments (e.g., pp. 9395 ). He has as well corrected (e.g., on Pannenberg, p. xxii; on Anselm, p. 157) or toned down (e.g., the description of monastic theology, p. 1) earlier statements. Reference to the possibility that Aquinas suffered a nervous breakdown disappears (p. 18). Still, the work remains substantially the same, reproducing even some typos (e.g., William of St. Armour [sic], p. 3) from the original. The new subtitle, Christ and Salvation in Catholic Thought from Anselm to Aquinas, is unfortunate. First, it leads one to expect a survey of the major soteriological positions articulated in the period between the two, hut such is not forthcoming. The work remains what the original title indicated, a study in the thought of Aquinas. Second, in that work Anselm plays hut a perfunctory role, serving as the foil from whose mercantile model (p. 73) or juridical mentality (p. 91) Thomas can advance to a more appropriately interpersonal grasp of the mode of our salvation. This reading of Anselm, however, leaves him in the hands of liberal Protestant historians of doctrine of the nineteenth century, and, as the bibliography indicates, it ignores more recent literature which rightly stresses the metaphysical and religious depth of Anselm's key concept of iustitia. For a precise rendering of the relation between Anselm and Aquinas, one may wish to place greater emphasis on ST III, q.14, a.I, ad 1. In that text Aquinas accomplishes two things. First, he integrates Anselm's concept of satis· faction with the traditional religious insight that, in some sense, Christ suffered what sinners deserve to suffer. At the same time he deepens the concept by rendering explicit the place of love and obedience as the formal element in satisfaction and thus rejoins Anselm in rejecting any strict notion of penal substitution. These reservations aside, the author's thorough, comprehensive, and competent investigation into Aquinas fills a lacuna in the history of soteriology, a lacuna, one regrets to say, still left open by the work of his immediate predecessor, B. Catao. At the same time the scope 148 BOOK REVIEWS of the author's work offers a further and important contribution. By researching Thomas's thought on satisfaction in the context of penance as well as soteriology, the author manages to suggest, and explicitly, that the generative matrix for Thomas's theoretic work in both areas lies in the cruciform dynamics of Christian conversion, the life of grace. With this insight he opens a door from historical theology to a contemporary systematics. Catholic University of America Washington, D.C. WILLIAM P. LOEWE Free Will and the Christian Faith. By W. S. ANGLIN. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. Pp. vii + 218. $55.00 (cloth). W. S. Anglin, a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow in Mathematics at McGill University, has produced a highly compact and compelling volume which attempts in just 218 pages to prove God's existence, to argue for personal immortality, to defend the coherence of theism against the problem of evil, to provide cogent analyses of both omnipotence and omniscience, and to examine criteria for distinguishing divine revelation from other forms of communication. The thread holding these rather motley swatches of cloth together is the author's concentration on libertarian freedom which weaves throughout the above issues in one way or another. It shows up in the expected places (e.g., in the so-called 'free will defense' of the problem of evil) but also in places hitherto unexpected (Anglin nicely argues that if humans are truly free in the libertarian sense, then it is appropriate and necessary that the Scriptures take the... (shrink)

There are two general classes of social conventions: conventions of coordination, and conventions of partial conflict. In coordination problems, the interests of the agents coincide, while in partial conflict problems, some agents stand to gain only if other agents unilaterally make certain sacrifices. Lewis' (1969) pathbreaking analysis of convention in terms of game theory focuses on coordination problems, and cannot accommodate partial conflict problems. In this paper, I propose a new game-theoretic definition of convention which generalizes previous game-theoretic definitions (Lewis (...) 1969, Vanderschraaf 1995), and which can be used to characterize norms of justice in partial conflict situations. I argue that the key structural property necessary for a social arrangement to be a convention is that it be conditionally self-enforcing, in the sense that: (i) each agent has a decisive reason to follow her end of the arrangement given that she expects all to do likewise, (ii) given a different set of expectations, some agents would have had a decisive reason to deviate, and (iii) these facts are common knowledge. This leads to a definition of convention as a strict correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974) together with appropriate common knowledge conditions. Examples are given in which it is shown how this more general account of convention can be used to analyze norms of justice as well as coordination problems. It is only a general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules. I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually express'd, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behavior. And this may properly be call'd a convention or agreement betwixt us,.. (shrink)

While cochlear implantation has benefitted many patients with single-sided deafness (SSD), there is great variability in cochlear implant (CI) outcomes and binaural performance remains poorer than that of normal-hearing (NH) listeners. Differences in sound quality across ears – temporal fine structure (TFS) information with acoustic hearing versus coarse spectro-temporal envelope information with electric hearing – may limit integration of acoustic and electric patterns. Binaural performance may also be limited by inter-aural mismatch between the acoustic input frequency and the place of (...) stimulation in the cochlea. SSD CI patients must learn to accommodate these differences between acoustic and electric stimulation to maximize binaural performance. It is possible that training may increase and/or accelerate accommodation and further improve binaural performance. In this study, we evaluated lateralization training in NH subjects listening to broad simulations of SSD CI signal processing. A 16-channel vocoder was used to simulate the coarse spectro-temporal cues available with electric hearing; the degree of inter-aural mismatch was varied by adjusting the simulated insertion depth (SID) to be 25 mm (SID25), 22 mm (SID22), and 19 mm (SID19) from the base of the cochlea. Lateralization was measured using headphones and head-related transfer functions (HRTFs). Baseline lateralization was measured for unprocessed speech (UN) delivered to the left ear to simulate SSD and for binaural performance with the acoustic ear combined with the 16-channel vocoders (UN+SID25, UN+SID22, and UN+SID19). After completing baseline measurements, subjects completed 6 lateralization training exercises with the UN+SID22 condition, after which performance was re-measured for all baseline conditions. Post-training performance was significantly better than baseline for all conditions (p<0.05 in all cases), with no significant difference in training benefits among conditions. Given that there was no significant difference between the SSD and the SSD CI conditions before or after training, the results suggest that NH listeners were unable to integrate TFS and coarse spectro-temporal cues across ears for lateralization, and that inter-aural mismatch played a secondary role at best. While lateralization training may benefit SSD CI patients, the training may largely improve spectral analysis with the acoustic ear alone, rather than improve integration of acoustic and electric hearing. (shrink)

We look at various notions of a class of definability operations that generalise inductive operations, and are characterised as “revision operations”. More particularly we: (i) characterise the revision theoretically definable subsets of a countable acceptable structure; (ii) show that the categorical truth set of Belnap and Gupta’s theory of truth over arithmetic using \emph{fully varied revision} sequences yields a complete \Pi13 set of integers; (iii) the set of \emph{stably categorical} sentences using their revision operator ψ is similarly \Pi13 and which (...) is complete in Gödel’s universe of constructible sets L; (iv) give an alternative account of a theory of truth—realistic variance that simplifies full variance, whilst at the same time arriving at Kripkean fixed points. (shrink)

This book is the third of a three-volume set on the innate mind. It provides an assessment of nativist thought and definitive reference point for future inquiry. Nativists have long been interested in a variety of foundational topics relating to the study of cognitive development and the historical opposition between nativism and empiricism. Among the issues here are questions about what it is for something to be innate in the first place; how innateness is related to such things as heritability, (...) genetic information, and theories of cognitive development; the status of arguments both for and against nativism; and how best to understand the role of genes in development and inheritance. These issues are all explored in one way or another in this book. But the book also looks to the future. Alongside state-of-the-art discussions of such established nativist concerns as language, number, spatial cognition, and social cognition, this book examines nativist work in a variety of areas where detailed nativist exploration is relatively new, including cultural learning, creativity, economic choice, culture, and morality. The expansion of nativist theorizing into all these new areas shows both the power and the promise of nativist approaches, and points the way to the future. (shrink)

Aim To explore the views in non-Western cultures about ending the lives of damaged newborns.Method 254 university students from India and 150 from Kuwait rated the acceptability of ending the lives of newborns with genetic defects in 54 vignettes consisting of all combinations of four factors: gestational age ; severity of genetic defect ; the parents’ attitude about prolonging care ; and the procedure used .Results Four clusters were identified by cluster analysis and subjected to analysis of variance. Cluster I, (...) labelled ‘Never Acceptable’, included 4% of the Indians and 59% of the Kuwaitis. Cluster II, ‘No Firm Opinion’, had little variation in rating from one scenario to the next; it included 38% of the Indians and 18% of the Kuwaitis. In Cluster III, ‘Parents’ Attitude+Severity+Procedure’, all three factors affected the ratings; it was composed of 18% of the Indians and 16% of the Kuwaitis. Cluster IV was called ‘Severity+Parents’ Attitude’ because these had the strongest impact; it was composed of 40% of the Indians and 7% of the Kuwaitis.Conclusions In accordance with the teachings of Islam versus Hinduism, Kuwaiti students were more likely to oppose ending a newborn's life under all conditions, Indian students more likely to favour it and to judge its acceptability in light of the different circumstances. (shrink)

James Conant, a proponent of the ‘New American Wittgenstein’, has argued that the standard inter- pretation of Wittgenstein is wholly mistaken in respect of Wittgenstein’s critique of metaphysics and the attendant conception of nonsense. The standard interpretation, Conant holds, misascribes to Wittgenstein Carnapian views on the illegitimacy of metaphysical utterances, on logical syntax and grammar, and on the nature of nonsense. Against this account, I argue that (i) Carnap is misrepresented; (ii) the so-called standard interpretation (in so far as I (...) have contributed to it) is misrepresented; (iii) Wittgenstein’s views, early and late, are misrepresented. I clarify Wittgen- stein’s conception of logical syntax and of the nonsense that results from transgressing it. (shrink)

L’article met à jour un désaccord très peu connu entre les PP. Gaston Fessard (1897-1978) et Henri de Lubac (1896-1991), à propos du discernement à poser sur le communisme et le progressisme chrétien entre 1945 et 1950. Après avoir dégagé les deux périodes qui marquent l’histoire de ce différend – publication de France, prends garde de perdre ta liberté (1945-1946) aux éditions du Témoignage chrétien (I) ; conférence du P. de Lubac sur « La conception de l’homme » aux Semaines (...) Sociales de juillet 1947 (II) – l’auteur analyse les raisons du désaccord, en pointant notamment le fait que le P. Fessard avait développé une véritable méthode de discernement des événements et des idéologies, là où le P. de Lubac ne disposait pas d’instrument équivalent (III). (shrink)

One might expect that Hegel’s lectures on the history of philosophy would not be some mere chronological analysis of the history of ideas. They are highly interpretative; but not just that. In a sense, they offer the conceptual background for his system; and one could argue that they are the high point of his philosophy of spirit.

Scott Soames’s two volume work Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century1 won the American 2003 Award for Best Professional/Scholarly Book in Philosophy. It has been said to be ‘a marvellous introduction to analytic philosophy’, to deliver much ‘solid information on this dense and difficult subject’, and it has been predicted to become the standard history of twentieth-century analytic philosophy.2 Professor Soames writes clearly and candidly. At the beginning of each volume he delineates his objectives and leitmotivs. He is concerned with (...) the development of analytic philosophy from 1900 to 1975. He aims ‘to explain what the most important analytic philosophers thought and why they thought it’ (I, xi). His method is ‘to provide clear, focused and intense critical examinations of some of the most important and representative works of each major philosopher discussed. ... to provide enough detail to allow one to understand and properly evaluate the main philosophical developments of the period’ (I, xvii). A book with such laudable objectives, which holds out such high promises, and which is predicted to become the standard history of modern analytic philosophy merits careful study and considered judgement. The questions that I shall pose are dictated by the author’s aims and methods. (i) Does Soames provide an illuminating overview of analytic philosophy from 1900 to 1975? (ii) Does he correctly explain what the most important analytic philosophers thought and why they thought it? (iii) Does he select ‘some of the most important and representative works of each major philosopher discussed’? (iv) Does he properly evaluate the main developments of the period? II The broad picture Soames paints is as follows. Analytic philosophy commenced with Moore’s defence of common sense, and was continued by Russell, whose theory of descriptions, conception of analysis, logicism and logical atomism are recounted. He was followed by Wittgenstein, who argued in the Tractatus that philosophical problems arise solely from misunderstandings of language and defended the view that all necessary truths are a priori, analytic, and hence true in virtue of the meanings of words.. (shrink)

The logic of quantum mechanical propositions—called quantum logic—is constructed on the basis of the operational foundation of logic. Some obvious modifications of the operational method, which come from the incommensurability of the quantum mechanical propositions, lead to the effective quantum logic. It is shown in this paper that in the framework of a calculization of this effective quantum logic the negation of a proposition is uniquely defined (Theorem I), and that a weak form of the quasimodular law can be derived (...) (Theorem II). Taking account of the definiteness of truth values for quantum mechanical propositions, the calculus of full quantum logic can be derived (Theorem III). This calculus represents an orthocomplemented quasimodular lattice which has as a model the lattice of subspaces of Hilbert space. (shrink)

The author investigates how the conception of legal validity as a specific mode of existence, adopted by Kelsen in Allgemeine Theorie der Normen (General Theory of Norms), can be reconciled with a conception of the legal system in which conflicts of legal norms remain of logical concern. To this end he makes use of Ludwig Wittgenstein's picture theory of the proposition as set out in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The conclusion is that in order to reconcile the two conceptions, the legal (...) system itself must be conceived of as consisting of three sub-systems, namely, (i) a sub-system of perceptible legal judgments, (ii) a sub-system of valid legal conditions, and (iii) a sub-system of observable social practices. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

A scholarly edition of a work by Adam Smith. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.

Divine Nature and Human Language is a collection of twelve essays in philosophical theology by William P. Alston, one of the leading figures in the current renaissance in the philosophy of religion. Using the equipment of contemporary analytical philosophy, Alston explores, partly refashions, and defends a largely traditional conception of God and His work in the world a conception that finds its origins in medieval philosophical theology. These essays fall into two groups: those concerned with theological language and those that (...) deal with the nature, status, and activity of God. In Part 1, Alston develops a conceptual scheme for discussing the topic of theological language. He also argues that there is a core of literal talk about God and even a core of predicates univocally applicable to God and creatures. Furthermore, he shows that God can be referred to directly as well as descriptively. In Parts II and III, the author sketches out a middle way between a classical conception of God exemplified by Aquinas and the more recent “process” or “panentheist” conception exemplified by Hartshorne. Alston argues that such a God can act so as to have real effects in the world and can enter into genuine dialogue and otherwise interact with human beings. In addition, he defends the idea that God provides a foundation for morality. The first collection of Alston's ground breaking work in the philosophy of religion, Divine Nature and Human Language will be welcomed by scholars and students of the philosophy of religion, metaphysics, theology, and religious studies. (shrink)

Continuateur d’Eusèbe de Césarée (265-339), Socrate de Constantinople (380-440), un des plus grands historiens de l’Antiquité chrétienne de langue grecque, est l’auteur d’une précieuse Histoire (publiée probablement vers 439/440) dont l’intérêt réside, non seulement dans le fait qu’elle prolonge de plus d’un siècle l’Histoire ecclésiastique d’Eusèbe, mais aussi parce qu’elle nous a conservé des documents historiques de la plus haute importance, souvent cités in extenso, et dont certains sont ..

Schwitzgebel (2001) — henceforth 'S' — offers three examples in order to convince us that there are situations in which individuals are neither accurately describable as believing that p or failing to so believe, but are rather in 'in-between states of belief'. He then argues that there are no 'Bayesian' or representational strategies for explicating these, and proposes a dispositional account. I do not have any fundamental objection to the idea that there might be 'in-between states of belief'. What I (...) shall argue, rather, is that: (I) S does not provide a convincing argument that there really are such states; (II) S does not show, as he claims, that 'in-between states of belief' could not be accounted for in terms of degrees of belief; (III) S’s dispositional account of 'in-between states of belief' is more problematic than the 'degree of belief' alternative. (shrink)

Part I: WHAT IS ETHICS? Plato: Socratic Morality: Crito. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part II: ETHICAL RELATIVISM VERSUS ETHICAL OBJECTIVISM. Herodotus: Custom is King. Thomas Aquinas: Objectivism: Natural Law. Ruth Benedict: A Defense of Ethical Relativism. Louis Pojman: A Critique of Ethical Relativism. Gilbert Harman: Moral Relativism Defended. Alan Gewirth: The Objective Status of Human Rights. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part III: MORALITY, SELF-INTEREST AND FUTURE SELVES. Plato: Why Be Moral? Richard Taylor: On the Socratic Dilemma. David Gauthier: Morality and (...) Advantage. Gregory Kavka: A Reconciliation Project. Derek Parfit: Later Selves and Moral Principles. Bernard Williams: Persons, Character, and Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part IV: VALUE. Jeremy Bentham: Classical Hedonism. Robert Nozick: The Experience Machine. Richard Taylor: Value and the Origin of Right and Wrong. Friedrich Nietzsche: The Transvaluation of Values. Derek Parfit: What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best? Thomas Nagel: Value: The View from Nowhere. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part V: UTILITARIANISM AND CONSEQUENTIALISM. John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism. J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism. Kai Nielsen: Against Moral Conservatism. Bernard Williams: Against Utilitarianism. John Hospers: Rule-Utilitarianism. Robert Nozick: Side Constraints. Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence and Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VI: KANTIAN AND DEONTOLOGICAL SYSTEMS. Immanuel Kant: Foundation for the Metaphysic of Morals. W. D. Ross: What Makes Right Acts Right? Onora O’Neill: Kantian Formula of the End in Itself and World Hunger. Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck. Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives. Judith Jarvis Thomson: Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VII: CONTRACTARIAN ETHICAL SYSTEMS. Thomas Hobbes: The Leviathan. David Gauthier: Why Contractarianism? John Rawls: Contractualism: Justice as Fairness. T.M. Scanlon: Contractualism and Utilitarianism. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VIII: VIRTUE-BASED ETHICAL SYSTEMS. Aristotle: The Ethics of Virtue. Bernard Mayo: Virtue and the Moral Life. William Frankena: A Critique of Virtue-Based Ethics. Walter Schaller: Are Virtues No More than Dispositions to Obey Moral Rules? Alasdair MacIntyre: The Nature of the Virtues. Susan Wolf: Moral Saints. Louis P. Pojman: In Defense of Moral Saints. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part IX: THE FACT/VALUE PROBLEM: METAETHICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. David Hume: On Reason and the Emotions: The Fact/Value Distinction. G. E. Moore: Non-Naturalism. A. J. Ayer: Emotivism. R. M. Hare: Prescriptivism: The Structure of Ethics and Morals. Geoffrey Warnock: The Object of Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part X: MORAL REALISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF SKEPTICISM. J.L. Mackie: The Subjectivity of Values. Jonathan Harrison: A Critique of Mackie’s Error Theory. Gilbert Harman: Moral Nihilism. Nicholas Sturgeon: Moral Explanations. Bernard Williams: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Bruce Russell: Two Forms of Ethical Skepticism. Michael Smith: A Defense of Moral Realism. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part XI: RELIGION AND ETHICS. Plato: Morality and Religion. Immanuel Kant: God and Immortality as Necessary Postulates of Morality. George Mavrodes: Religious and the Queerness of Morality. Kai Nielson: Ethics Without God. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part XII: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO CLASSICAL ETHICAL THEORY. Part A. Sociobiology and the Question of Moral Responsibility. Charles Darwin: Ethics and the Descent of Man. E.O.Wilson: Sociobiology and Ethics. Michael Ruse: Evolution and Ethics: The Sociobiological Approach. Elliot Sober: Prospects for an Evolutionary Ethics. J.L. Mackie: The Law of the Jungle, Evolution and Morality. Suggestions for Further Readingon Sociobiology. Part B. The Challenge of Determinism to Moral Responsibility and Desert. Galen Strawson: The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. Louis Pojman: Free Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility:A Response to Galen Strawson. Richard Taylor: A Libertarian Defense of Free Will and Responsibility. Suggestions for Further Reading on Moral Responsibility. Glossary of Ethical Terms. (shrink)

Conversational Artificial Intelligence (CAI) systems (also known as AI “chatbots”) are among the most promising examples of the use of technology in mental health care. With already millions of users worldwide, CAI is likely to change the landscape of psychological help. Most researchers agree that existing CAIs are not “digital therapists” and using them is not a substitute for psychotherapy delivered by a human. But if they are not therapists, what are they, and what role can they play in mental (...) health care? To answer these questions, we appeal to two well-established and widely discussed concepts: cognitive and affective artifacts. Cognitive artifacts are artificial devices contributing functionally to the performance of a cognitive task. Affective artifacts are objects which have the capacity to alter subjects’ affective state. We argue that therapeutic CAIs are a kind of cognitive-affective artifacts which contribute to positive therapeutic change by (i) simulating a (quasi-)therapeutic interaction, (ii) supporting the performance of cognitive tasks, and (iii) altering the affective condition of their users. This sheds new light on why virtually all existing mental health CAIs implement principles and techniques of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy — a therapeutic orientation according to which affective change and, ultimately, positive therapeutic change is mediated by cognitive change. Simultaneously, it allows us to conceptualize better the potential and limitations of applying these technologies in therapy. (shrink)

One would like to be able to say that a large part of the material in this book is so obvious as to be unnecessary. Unfortunately, this book is worthwhile precisely because one cannot. Bandman's problem may be stated as follows: By what canons and criteria does one evaluate arguments in the philosophy of education? How, in particular, do we correctly evaluate arguments about what ought to be taught? The book is thus an exercise in the "metaphilosophy" of education. In (...) the first, polemical half of the volume the author convincingly demonstrates that numerous and typical patterns of argument employed in the philosophy of education by many authors violate some of the most basic and pervasive logical rules. The really striking thing here is that Bandman persuasively charges numerous well respected educational thinkers with informal fallacies that a freshman logic student would not commit. The constructive side of Bandman's work is a bit more dubious. Initially, he distinguishes between two senses of "argument": Sense I and Sense II. These are, respectively, a "special evaluative type of argument, which does not intend to demonstrate the conclusion, and is used in giving intellectual backing to [it]," and the usual sense of argument common to formal logic. Bandman's thesis is that arguments in Sense I are "capricious," inconclusive, and typically unsound, while educational arguments in Sense II are either unsound or irrelevant. He proposes a middle way between the horns of this dilemma by urging a third sense of "argument" as the provision of "good enough" and "cogent" reasons. At least two lines of attack on Bandman's position are available. In the first place, in dismissing the utility of Sense II arguments, he makes rather facile use of the noncognitivist view that moral statements are neither true nor false. Secondly, Bandman does not adequately spell out his Sense III notion of "argument," and the few necessary conditions that he does provide fail to clarify in what sense the premisses support the conclusion and how Sense III really differs from Sense I. Despite these criticisms, the merits of the book are many, and it deserves a wide reading by philosophers and educators alike.—H. P. K. (shrink)

This selection of readings in ethics is divided into five parts: Classical and Medieval Intellectualist Thought; Dialectical Thought; American Naturalistic Thought; Analytic-Positivist Thought; Existentialist and Post-Existentialist Thought. An anthology such as this one is needed to balance the limited selections offered in the area of morality contained in the anthologies dealing with philosophy in general. For example Part II contains selections from Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, and Engels. And Part III features James, Dewey, Edel, Hook, Romanell, and Dennes. It would (...) not be possible to include the majority of these authors' writings on ethics in an anthology dealing with philosophy generally. This anthology could best be used in introductory courses in ethics. Some of the introductions given to each of the five parts are good and the rest are adequate. At the end of each reading there are questions designed to guide the reading and discussion. This could have been omitted without any loss to the anthology. At the conclusion of each part there is a limited list of recommended readings. For the beginning student of ethical theory Approaches To Morality offers a quick but fairly inclusive view of the various ways in which some individuals have approached the philosophical problems inherent in a study of morality.--W. P. G. (shrink)

Dieses von mir im J. 1924 behandelte Papyrusbruchstück wurde 1927 von v. Wilamowitz berücksichtigt. Er hält meine Zurückfuhrüng des Bruchstückes auf Antiphon für sehr ansprechend und auch meine Erklärung für treffend; die Ergänzungen befriedigen ihn nur zum Teil. Letzteres muss ich ihm unbedingt zugeben. Leider sind alle kleinen Fragmente des Papyrus sowie die Zz. 1–6 des Fr. B bei dem Hinüberführen aus England nach Amerika spurlos verschwunden und somit fiir die Wissenschaft auf immer verloren; es ist also nicht mehr möglich (...) zu beurteilen, ob ich Recht hatte, als ich die Zz. 14–15 des Fr. A mit dem Fr. F vereinigte. Dagegen ist Col. II. des Fr. A glücklicherweise erhalten; Prof. W. L. Westermann legte eine ganz hervorragende Freundlichkeit an den Tag, indem er mir zuerst eine photographische Aufnahme davon zusandte und dann meine Lesung an der Hand des Originals prüfte. Bei dem näheren Studium der Photographie bemerkte ich, dass sowohl Hunts Lesung der Z. 7 wie auch meine fruhere durch diese falsche Lesung ins Leben gerufene Erganzung ganz unmöglich sind. Auf der Photographie las ich Z. 7 t περ[ι] επ[ ]ηδ‐‑, und teilte dieses Ergebnis W. L. Westermann mit. Nachdem er in das Original noch einmal eingesehen hatte, antwortete er mir darauf; ‘Das ist die richtige Lesung. Es ist absolut sicher.’ Zu der scheinbar nächstliegenden Ergänzung Περ[] έπ[ιτ]ηδ[ευ]μάτων, die auch ich im ersten Augenblick für passend hielt, kam Westermann, nachdem ihm mein Vorschlag zur richtigen Lesung des Textes bekannt worden war, ganz unabhängig von mir; ich glaube trotzdem dass diese Lesung nicht das Richtige trifft. Wir haben doch in Col. II. eine Reihe von Antithesen ; aus περ Υο‐‑ νης ist aber keine Antithese zu έπιτηδεύματα zu konstruieren. Was nun diese Stelle anbetrifft, so ist hier nur die Lesung Υο möglich, keinesfalls aber das von mir a. a. O. vermutete Υα Aus den Resten Υο. νης oder Υο.νης ist allerdings kein griechisches Wort zu erganzen; doch haben die einzelnen Zeilen des Papyrus nicht gleiche Längen, sodass nichts dem im Wege steht, dass Z. nach Υο auch nichts gestanden habe; dann gelangen wir zur Lesung: πε[ρ] Υο[] έπ[ικ]ηδ [ευ]μάτων, d. h. ‘von der Geburt der Menschen sowie von den Bestattungsbrauchen’ —auch hier haben wir dann, wie in alien anderen Antithesen von Col. II. an der ersten Stelleυμξφροντα, an der zweiten ξυμΦέροντα, vgl. Antiphon, P. Oxy. 1364, Col. III., Z. 28: κατμένξναύτοέστινάΠων. (shrink)